The theme of my presentation is about traditions and the leadership of Malaysia¹s Mahathir Mohamed. Before I go into the guts of the issue, I think it is useful to look at the historical origins of leadership traditions.

We form perceptions about people all the time and experts believe we are innately predisposed to this behaviour which they call perceptual knowledge[1]. Therefore if we perceive the emergence of a prophet or leader as a sign of fate, then we should not have any problem surmising that this leader is pre-destined. Early rulers of the Malay World, just like most rulers of the time, also had this perceptual knowledge. The difference was that they only perceived themselves as those who were pre-destined and this was by virtue of their supposed divine descent. But we have leaders in our century too who have regarded themselves in such lofty terms.

Malay society had a belief system that venerated the ruler for his perceived mystical powers and whose well-being was crucial to the welfare of his people. Essentially, the ruler was seen as the Provider. With the coming of Hinduism (used interchangeably with Buddhism) leadership traits evolved as the Malay rulers take on the mystique of the Hindu gods and introduced elaborate court rituals. Some of these rituals are still evident in royal ceremonies today[2].

The culture of leadership in the Islamized Malay World combined many aspects of indigenous and Hindu heritage of divinity which remained the essence of legitimacy and authority. Though public displays of their supernatural rituals are obviously a thing of the past, their concepts are far from diminishing, and are even obliquely suggested in some matters of adat or homily customs, royal symbolisms, and by the dramatization of mythologies in bangsawan or opera. While these aspects would appear to be contrary to Islamic orthodoxy, they underlined the durability of historical perceptions and the continuing mystification of the Islamic leadership.

AThese are some of the elements of tradition that have been inherited by modern Malaysia. Over the years, they have been re-interpreted and adapted to new social circumstances.

Tradition

In its extreme form, tradition has been touted as pristine virtue for social control. It claims ideological and historical merit, and in the case of religious authority, moral judgement. Unfortunately, tradition has been responsible for reinforcing divisions in plural communities such as in Malaysia with its three major races and four major religions.

In its subtle form, tradition represents a legacy that is majestic and sacred handed down by wise men of our ancestral past. It is a norm for propriety, spirituality goodness, ethical behaviour and basis for customary law. Like religion, tradition has strands of rigidity one must follow for moral duty or be punished by its terrifying authority. Islam has been used to manipulate such symbolisms of tradition for political ends despite their apparent contradictions. 

The difficulty of tradition is that it purports truth that is difficult to verify or rationalize. It is so seductively persuasive as it offers a tremendous sense of belonging and fellowship.

Ironically, as this paper hopes to show, the leadership of Mahathir owes little to tradition though he legitimizes it continually with rhetoric of tradition. Both tradition or adat and religion have played significant roles in Malaysian leadership politics. And there have been calls, in recent times, for a new initiative of Malay unity and tradition following defections of UMNO members principally, to PAS[3].

But Mahathir has rarely said anything particularly praiseworthy of the Malays. In his book, The Malay Dilemma he proposed a rather fantastic fusion of inscrutable breeding theories among the Malays. He says he favours mixed breeding because offsprings of mixed descent, as he is himself, are less likely to have mutant genes and are therefore conceivably superior. Recently, he decries the inability of the Malays to compete with the Chinese[4]. Of the practice of traditions, he said people who hold strongly to traditions may not develop and prosper or become wealthy"[5].

Mahathir is a modernist-traditionalist. One who moderates modernism with only a sprinkling of tradition. But Mahathir¹s modernity is beneath a veneer of conservatism that is sometimes confused with traditionalism. For Mahathir is nostalgic of traditions, not for the sake for traditions but, rather for the past when times were more predictable and when he was more in control. It was not until after the General Elections of 1999 when Mahathir began to realize that the outcome was a telling reflection of his own leadership of UMNO[6]. He knew the tradition card he had played for so long was a façade he could no longer mask in the face of a more informed, young western-educated Islamic political force. The mould he has cast himself into, is beginning to crack as a more consultative style is demanded of him ­ a cleaner and a more fundamentally Islamist leadership. Mahathir has yet to respond to this ­ his re-election to the UMNO presidency gives him little reason to. He thinks it is a vindication of his leadership style.   

In terms of traditional legacy, Mahathir certainly typifies the strong charismatic patriarchal leadership. Like his predecessors and the sultans, he too believes in strong paternalistic, benevolent governance. If tradition means an obedient regard for the established institutions of the nation, Mahathir seems to have a different view. His forays with the judiciary, the sultans and religious zealots underlined a leader impatient with arguments about symbolisms and traditions. With royalty, he found himself in the thick of constitutional crises that demeaned the traditional supremacy of the sultans. But in March this year, he appealed to the sultans to help unite the Malays[7]. This was an obvious attempt to keep an appearance of tradition but it sent confusing signals on how he regards the sultans whose mana he had seriously eroded. And why he is feeling so powerless about Malay unity? The answer probably lies in the recent spate with PAS that UMNO and indirectly Mahathir are unIslamic, something that is deeply offensive to mention to Muslims.

He tries to appear an Islamic modernist but equally he wants to portray himself as a Malay traditionalist because he believes that this is what the Malaysian society expects him to be. But then he shuns the songkok or Malay cap as much as he could and his wife is no believer of the tudung, Malay veil that covers the hair and down the neck. He thought he would emerge as the virtuous traditionalist over the Anwar saga but was instead cursed for his ruthlessness. So far, Mahathir has had no skeletons in his cupboard and has shown himself to be the upright, moral leader. And that has been his drawcard upon which he often asserts his moral authority. With reference to Anwar, Mahathir chides those with less morals as unworthy of office[8]. Of traditions, he implores the creation of a new breed of Malays who, he said, should be wary of Islamic scholars who invented traditions to justify unIslamic practices[9]. 

But Malaysia lacks a distinct ideology and this adds to the confusion between the schism of Islamic obedience and secular unity. The Rukunegara, the national ideology introduced by Tun Razak in 1970, is inadequate in facing new challenges. It needs to be revitalized to inject new ideas for national unity especially among disparate Muslim groups. But Mahathir has done little in this area. He appears overly pre-occupied with admonishing western influences. His selective ideas of democracy, the media, world opinion, and human virtues are often seen as a swipe at the west rather than at any real attempt to articulate ideological arguments[10]. He snaps at criticisms and in his cantankerous way depicts a man utterly authoritative and intolerant of contrary views best exemplified by the events of the Anwar saga. The issue, many felt, was over Anwar¹s disloyalty to Mahathir, something that is considered a grave sin in Malay tradition. Whichever way one views the case, Anwar¹s prolonged ordeal strikes at the very chord of Malay and Islam¹s forgiving nature. The case also views Mahathir negatively as unMalay and uncharitable to a fellow Muslim brother. Mahathir¹s predecessors had treated more severe miscreants leniently, quietly and tactfully. This was the Malay and traditional way of doing things.

But suddenly Mahathir is back in the popularity stakes. In October 1999 Moody upgraded Malaysia¹s financial ranking and the stock market had a bull run. His aggressive economic management was rewarded with a phenomenal economic turnaround[11]. Assured that he has the job of leader for at least another five years, it would seem that all should be well for him. But if continued rumblings about Malay unity and rumours of in-fighting are to be believed, Mahathir¹s problems do not seem to have abated[12]. He realizes too that the racial stability that the country has enjoyed for three decades could be undone quite quickly if religious bigotry runs rampant in the name of traditionalism. 

Globalizing Leadership

With this in mind, how does Mahathir join the ranks of global leadership and push Malaysia towards his vision of Wawasan 2020 ­ the year he envisioned the country would be developed? He enjoys a favourable international image but would also like to be recognized as a modern Islamic leader. He is mindful of his position with the Islamic world which is by and large solidly conservative and with which he enjoys tremendous popularity.

While he revels in international praise, he is mindful also of the Islamic conservatives back home who are apprehensive of their Islamic leader shedding too much tradition for globalizing the western way. Mahathir said he will not ape the west as its media have always given him a bad image[13].

Mahathir¹s tirade against the west is almost legendary. He blames the west for his economic ills in 1998, and said recently that the rich west was out to impoverish developing economies under the guise of globalization[14]. But such rhetoric is pleasing to the ears of his fellow Malaysians who see him as a true traditionalist unspoilt by western influence.

Mahathir said he was not ready to step down until some Œmajor issues¹ were taken care of. He thinks he owes UMNO the duty of winning back those Malays lost to PAS and to a lesser extent, to Keadilan. Throughout the financial crisis, Malay business more than just floundered. The very idea of NEP and economic bumiputraism was under serious threat. Mahathir was under pressure to bail-out selective Malay businesses because their survival would reflect on his traditional Islamic benevolence. Besides, he counted much on the Malay business elite for faithful political support.

Secondly, since the Anwar debacle, Mahathir has shown increasing resilience of his staying power either trying to prove that he was a good judge of people or probably afraid that a withdrawal from power would be perceived as defeat.

Mahathir has to play the tradition card so long as Islam dominates lives of all Malays as it implies pious and decent leadership. But Malay leadership is evolving and is still in the throes of finding a proper mix for its cultural diversity. The political framework of Malaysia too lacks cohesion with its myriad of small federal states, sultans, chief ministers, and governors. Two states are in the hands of extreme Islamic parties which are now toying with the idea of adopting Koranic laws.  

Mahathir has to take some responsibility for the state of affairs. He recently shocked the nation by suggesting that it is possible for Malaysia to have a non-Malay prime minister[15]. This, of course, goes against the grain of Malay power. The Chinese and Indian partners in the government coalition were quick to play down this scenario obviously sensing the sensitivity of the Malays over such talk. His seeming willingness to listen to Chinese concerns, especially over issues of parity plus continuing allegations of cronyism, went down badly with the Malays. No one can disagree that he did test Malay patience when he was seen pandering for Chinese votes in the last General Elections. But it has to be acknowledged that the Barisan Nasional win was clearly owed to solid Chinese support. And now this talk of a possible Chinese prime minister? The Chinese and the older party guard would prefer that he stayed around because he could be trusted to keep his promise. But more importantly, he stood for status quo in his dealings with the non-Malays.

Conclusion

Finally, Mahathir is an enigma of the 21st century. Though Malaysia¹s political leaders have never claimed any divine calling, there is a perception that they possess the wahyu or the divine radiance. Or that they have been decreed by kismet or will of god for their takdir or fate. This is what perceptual knowledge is all about. And there is every reason to believe that it is also intrinsic in Mahathir who no doubt believes he still has the wahyu. A fatalistic remark one often hears in Malay when someone is elected to office is, "Tuhan sudah di-takdirkan Š" meaning god has decreed it or its god¹s will. As he implies in his book, Mahathir must think he is genetically superior and that he has the duty to uplift the weak. And he could well be, given his remarkable leadership despite all that have been said to the contrary. And if he has to defer to tradition to emphasize his Malayness, who can blame him for going forward but looking backwards occasionally. But if he keeps looking backwards and yearns for the good old days, he will inevitably trip and tradition will not be there to pick him up.

 

Footnotes

[1] Read Fraser, Alexander Campbell, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894, Dancy, Jonathan, Perceptual Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, and Scott, Dominic, Recollections and Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[2] For example, the ancient ciri recited in lustration ceremonies are apprently still in use. For an account of the origin of the ciri genealogy of ancient kings and its use in the lustration of the first Malay king, see Brown, Malay Annals, op. cit., p. 25; for description of the enthronement ceremony of Sultan Muhammad Syah in traditional Srivijayan style during which the ciri was also used, see also Brown, Malay Annals op. cit., p. 56; Perak apparently still keeps this custom in its enthronement ceremonies see R.O. Winstedt, Kingship and Enthronement in Malaya, JMBRAS vol. 20, 1947, pp. 129-139; for extract of the ciri see R.O. Winstedt and R.J. Wilkinson, A History of Perak, JMBRAS vol. 12, pt. 1, June 1934, republished 1974, p. 175.

[3] In a speech to Malaysian students at Imperial College, UK, Dr Rais Yatim, Minister in the Prime Minister¹s Department, said that many young Malay professionals did not know Œwhat the Malay agenda is and our struggles for the community¹. He said this in reference to his suggestion that Malays of all political parties should get together to find ways to strengthen Malay unity. This call came amidst many young UMNO members defecting to PAS and also the latter¹s challenge to UMNO as a more Islamic party. Straits Times, 3 May 2000.

[4] Straits Times, 5 June 2000, and 23 June 2000.

[5] In a speech at the UMNO General Assembly, 11 May 2000

[6] Mahathir said UMNO lost seats due to personality and intra-party rivalries alluding the rivalry to Anwar building personal loyaties around. But in the same report, Najib Tun Razak admitted problems were with party policies. See Straits Times, 12 December, 1999.

[7] Straits Times, 25 March 2000.

[8] Straits Times, 12 May 2000.

[9] Speech in Kuala Lumpur, "The Islamic World and Global Cooperation: Preparing for the 21st Century". The Oxford Islamic Forum, 25 April 1997.

[10] The national ideology of Rukunegara, known as the Articles of Faith of the State, is literally a pledge of unity and obedience to the State containing five principles: belief in God, loyalty to King and Country, upholding the Constitution, rule of law, and good behaviour and morality. These principles were to be achieved by five objectives: unity, democracy, justice, liberalism, and progress. The new ideology beseeched '.. a greater unity of all her peoples.. ensuring a liberal approach to.. diverse cultural traditionsŠ'.

[11] Straits Times, 11 February 2000.

[12] Mahathir attributed the defeat of several UMNO veterans in the 1999 General Elections to intra-party rivalries and defections to PAS and Keadilan. Najib Tun Razak admitted there were also problems with UMNO policies. See Straits Times, 12 December 1999.

[13] Straits Times, 6 June 2000.

[14] Straits Times, 24 May 2000.

[15] Straits Times, 20 June 2000.